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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
reversal, but did not consider the dismissal on the merits because that issue
had not been before the Appellate Division. The minority (2) dissented on
the ground that the Appellate Division's reversal of the leave to apply de novo
altered the effect of the dismissal by making it conclusive of the entire matter,
which it had not been previously. Because of the change in the effect of the
dismissal the minority felt that that issue was before them and that the case
should have been remanded for a full hearing on the merits, which hearing
had not been given on the original trial.
Both in New York and in other jurisdictions, it is clear that a party
must raise an issue in an intermediate appellate court in order to preserve
that issue for determination in a higher court.2 4 On its face the minority's
contention that the Appellate Division decision effected the dismissal on the
merits and thus brought that issue before the Court of Appeals, is appealing.
However, at the time of the Commission's appeal the petitioner could have
foreseen the effects of a reversal on the question of reapplication. At that time
by choosing not to appeal the dismissal on the merits, he waived his right
to litigate the issue further. Such a result may seem unduly technical, but
it is historically accepted and probably necessary to an orderly system of
appellate review.
MANDAmus-A DISCRETIONARY REMEDY
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedial device which is granted only after
the exercise of sound judicial discretion.25 Since it is a discretionary remedy,
it is difficult to set out any definitive standard wherein its issuance is assured.
However, there appear to be two circumstances that will cause the Court to
deny the remedy: (1) first, where the order would cause disorder and confusion
in public affairs; 26 (2) and second, where there is a more appropriate remedy
available2 7
In Ahern v. Board of Supervisors,2 8 the Board of Supervisors of Suffolk
County appointed a Democratic Election Commissioner without the appointee
having been recommended by the Chairman of the Democratic Committee as
required by Subdivision 2 of Section 52 of the Election Law.2 9 The Chairman
24. Stack v. Nat'l City Bank, 278 N.Y. 388, 394, 16 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1938);
In re 43d Ave., 282 N.Y. 42, 47, 24 N.E.2d 841, 842 (1939); In re Segall's Will, 287
N.Y. 52, 60, 38 N.E.2d 126, 130 (1941); Bank of Ariz. v. Thomas Heavy Co., 232 U.S.
106, 110 (1913); Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 III. 196, 172
N.E. 35 (1930); Stafford v. Stafford, 299 Ill. 438, 132 N.E. 452 (1921); Cline v. Niblo,
117 Tex. 474, 8 S.W.2d 633 (1928).
25. Andresen v. Rice, 277 N.Y. 271, 14 N.E.2d 65 (1938); Duncan Townsite Co. v.
Lane, 245 U.S. 308 (1917).
26. Andresen v. Rice, supra note 25.
27. Walsh v. LaGuardia, 269 N.Y. 437, 199 N.E. 652 (1936); In re Gardner, 68
N.Y. 467 (1877).
28. 6 N.Y.2d 376, 189 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1959).
29. N.Y. ELECTON LAW § 52(2) provides that:
At least five days before the first day of January in each odd numbered
year . . . the respective chairman of the county committees of each
of the two political parties . . . shall certify the name of a person
who is recommended as a fit and proper person to be appointed a com-
missioner of elections.
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would only recommend himself and the Board, acting within its discretionary
limits, refused to accept him. Petitioner brought a mandamus-type proceed-
ing30 to revoke the Board's appointment and Special Term granted the order.8 '
The Appellate Division reversed, 32 and the Court of Appeals affirmed (4-3). 33
The majority held that the Appellate Division had not abused its discre-
tion in denying the writ. It agreed that issuance of the mandamus order could
result in damage to the public interest in that it would cause a complete break-
down of the election machinery. 34 The dissent contended that this was not a
real danger because the Democratic Chairman could be forced to submit a
name other than his own, thereby, giving the Election Commission its required
bi-partisan membership.
It appears that even if mandamus would be an appropriate remedy,
some overriding factor may cause the Court to deny it.35 This is true even
where the order asked for is to prevent the derogation of a strict legal right.3 6
This is a harsh rule and an appellate court should closely scrutinize the
discretion to insure that it is not abused. In this case it seems that there was
an abuse of discretion since the danger of public disorder did not appear to
be well founded.
MANDAMUS TO REvIEw ELECTION PETITIONS
In Mansfield v. Epstein37 the Court of Appeals held that two different
procedures are available to review acts of the Commissioners of Elections
where the acts complained of are ministerial and mandamus will lie. An order
had been sought under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act to compel the
Ulster County Commissioners of Election to print appellants' names on the
ballot for the forthcoming election. The petitions nominating the appellants
had been rejected because the Commissioners were in disagreement as to their
validity. The Supreme Court had considered the action as one under Section
330 of the Election Law,38 which section gives the Supreme Court summary
jurisdiction in election cases. This position of the Court, based on a decision
that a mandamus order could not be directed to the Commissioners, was
affirmed by the Appellate Division.39
The Court of Appeals reversed this determination and held that the Com-
30. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT art. 78.
31. 17 Misc. 2d 164, 184 N.Y.S.2d 894 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
32. 7 A.D.2d 538, 185 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1959).
33. Supra note 28.
34. Petitioner asserted, in an action brought to restrain the Board of Elections
from functioning when there is only one commissioner in office, that the board has no
right to perform any of its duties until a representative of the Democratic party is
properly appointed. If petitioner is correct in its assertion, it would cause a disfranchise-
ment of the voters of Suffolk County.
35. For a discussion of the problem, see 4 BuFrALo L. REV. 334 (1955).
36. See Warehousemen's -Ass'n of Port of New York v. Cosgrove, 241 N.Y. 580,
150 N.E. 563 (1925) where the court held that the remedy of mandamus may be withheld
where the enforcement of a strict legal right would work unnecessary hardship.
37. 5 N.Y.2d 70, 180 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1958).
38. N.Y. ELEcTIox LAW § 330.
39. Mansfield v. Epstein, 7 A.D.2d 612, 178 N.Y.S.2d 812 (3d Dep't 1958).
